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I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

U.S. patent law has traditionally been territorial in nature, which limits direct
infringement liability to activities in the territorial United States. In pertinent part,
§ 271(a) of the U.S. Patent Act provides, “whoever without authority makes, uses, offers
to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United
States any patented invention . . . infringes the patent.”1 However, exponential growth in
intellectual property issues in international transactions during recent decades pushed
Congress and the judiciary to adjust the extra-territorial reach of U.S. patent protection.
To conform to the international trade community, Congress amended § 271(a) in 1994 to
add two new forms of infringement: (1) “offers to sell . . . within the United States” and
(2) “imports into the United States.”2 This Note focuses on the definition of “offer to
sell” infringement and recent progress within the Federal Circuit in interpreting the scope
of offer to sell infringement under § 271(a).
Interpretation of the offer to sell provision has serious ramifications for both
domestic and international companies involved in cross-border transactions. Although it
seems likely that a court would find liability if both the offer and the contemplated sale
occur in the United States, problems arise when only one of the two activities occurs
domestically. While Congress intended the addition of offer to sell infringement to
strengthen the protection afforded under § 271,3 the scant legislative history provides
courts and litigants with little guidance in the construction and application of this statute.4
During the past decade, the Federal Circuit has only had a few opportunities to wrestle
with the issues involved in cross-border deals. These decisions have sparked numerous
academic comments and led to inconsistent holdings at the district court level. Although
the debate over § 271(a) is far from over and will probably require congressional action
to clean up the ambiguity of the statutory provision, the most recent Federal Circuit
opinion on this issue, Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk
*

Yan Wang is a third year law student at Northwestern University School of Law.
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
2
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 533(a), 108 Stat. 4809, 4988 (1994) (codified
as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271).
3
See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT): Intellectual Property Provisions: J. Hearing on
H.R. 4894 and S. 2368 Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop. & Judicial Admin. of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights & Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
103d Cong. 109, 127 (1995) (statement of Bruce A. Lehman, Assistant Sec’y of Commerce and Comm’r of
Patents & Trademarks) (stating that the amendments “add to the rights of a patent owner”).
4
See Timothy R. Holbrook, Liability for the “Threat of a Sale”: Assessing Patent Infringement for
Offering to Sell an Invention and Implications for the On-sale Patentability Bar and Other Forms of
Infringement, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 751, 754 n.19 (2003).
1
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Contractors USA, Inc.,5 may bring some clarity to the court’s approach toward offer to
sell infringement.
In Transocean, the Federal Circuit considered a transaction that illustrated the
problem of applying offer to sell infringement after its decision in Rotec Industries, Inc.
v. Mitsubishi Corp.6 Two U.S. companies negotiated a contract in Norway to sell a
drilling rig to a company located in the United States to be used in the Gulf of Mexico.7
The patentee of the drilling rig brought suit against the seller, Maersk USA, alleging,
inter alia, infringement under § 271(a) by offering to sell the patented rig within the
United States. The defendant cited the opinions of Rotec and MEMC Electronic
Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., which together suggest a
requirement of domestic offering activity to find infringement for offering to sell within
the United States.8 The defendant argued that negotiation and execution of a contract
outside of the United States could not have given rise to liability under the offer to sell
provision.9
The Federal Circuit disagreed with the defendant’s position that, under Rotec and
MEMC, offer to sell infringement requires offering activity to occur with the United
States. The court noted that such a construction of § 271(a) would “exalt form over
substance by allowing a U.S. company to travel abroad to make offers to sell back into
the U.S. without any liability for infringement . . . creat[ing] a real harm in the U.S. to a
U.S. patentee.”10 The court concluded that the location of the contemplated sale activity
should control for the inquiry of whether there had been an offer to sell claim under
§ 271(a).11 It then held that the contract between two U.S. companies in Transocean for
performance within the United States could constitute offer to sell infringement.12
The holding of Transocean has significant implications for the application of the
offer to sell provision under § 271(a). By shifting the focus from the location of the offer
to the location of the contemplated sale and performance, Transocean may finally resolve
much of the confusion surrounding the application of offer to sell infringement to crossborder transactions. This Note provides a detailed analysis of Transocean’s potential
impact on the landscape of offer to sell infringement. It begins by providing a
background for the evolution of offer to sell infringement under § 271(a) in Part II. Part
III summarizes case law in the Federal Circuit prior to Transocean that has largely
shaped offer to sell infringement. Part IV presents a snapshot of the post-Rotec divide at
the district court level as to the exact scope of offer to sell infringement under § 271(a).
Part V provides a detailed account of the decision in Transocean. Finally, Part VI
attempts to reconcile Transocean with the previous decisions from the Federal Circuit
and argues that Transocean is correctly decided.

5

617 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1309 (citing Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
7
Id. at 1296.
8
Id. at 1308 (citing Rotec, 215 F.3d at 1258–60 and MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials
Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
9
Id.
10
Id. at 1309.
11
Id.
12
Id. at 1310.
6
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II. EVOLUTION OF OFFER TO SELL INFRINGEMENT
¶6

¶7

¶8

¶9

Congress amended § 271(a) to include the offer to sell provision in 1994. To
understand and apply this provision properly, it is necessary to look back to the history
and circumstances surrounding its creation. Section 271 of the U.S. Patent Act generally
prescribes what constitutes patent infringement.13 Prior to 1994, only making, using, or
selling patented inventions constituted direct infringement under § 271(a).14 A “threat of
a sale,” on the other hand, did not constitute an act of infringement.15
In 1994, the international community took a major step forward in an effort to
harmonize international intellectual property laws. The participating nations of the
Uruguay Round negotiations agreed to revise the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT), which resulted in the establishment of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) and the adoption of the leading international treaty on intellectual property
laws16—Trade-Related Aspects of International Property Rights (TRIPs).17
The TRIPs Agreement, for the first time in the history of international trade,
established minimum exclusive rights that the member countries should provide to the
owners of intellectual property.18 To bring U.S. patent law into conformity with the
obligations created by the TRIPs Agreement, Congress amended § 271(a), (c), (e), and
(g) of the Patent Act to add two new forms of infringement conduct: offering to sell and
importing a patented invention.19
The 1994 amendment to § 271 significantly expanded the scope of protection
offered by U.S. patent law, allowing the patentees to act against threats to its monopoly
even when no actual sale had occurred within the United States.20 However, these
amendments were accompanied by virtually no guidance on interpretation and
application from Congress.21 Such lack of legislative guidance and the ambiguity of the
statutory language resulted in a dispute over the scope of offer to sell infringement.

13

See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006).
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994).
15
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 915 F.2d 670, 673 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
16
For more information on GATT, the Uruguay Round negotiations, TRIPs, and the formation of the
WTO, see generally WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org (last visited June 5, 2012).
17
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 28, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299.
18
For patent, in particular, the TRIPs agreement provides:
A patent shall confer on its owner the following exclusive rights:
(a) where the subject matter of a patent is a product, to prevent third parties not having
the owner’s consent from the acts of: making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing
for these purposes that product;
(b) where the subject matter of a patent is a process, to prevent third parties not having
the owner’s consent from the act of using the process, and from the acts of: using, offering
for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes at least the product obtained directly by that
process.
TRIPS, Id. at art. 28(1) (footnotes omitted).
19
See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 533(a), 108 Stat. 4809, 4988 (1994)
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006)).
20
See 3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“The amendment to
§ 271(a) represents a distinct change to the bases for patent infringement, because liability arose previously
only as the result of an actual sale.”).
21
See Holbrook, supra note 4, at 753 & n.16.
14
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The current language of § 271(a) reads: “Except as otherwise provided in this title,
whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention,
within the United States or imports into the United States any patent invention during the
term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.”22 In contrast to the original forms of
infringement, such as making, using, or selling, offer to sell infringement involves one
extra layer of activity—i.e., there has to be an offer, and the offer has to be for a sale of
the patented product. This extra layer created unique problems in interpreting the
meaning of “offers to sell . . . within the United States.”23 To which action should the
modifier “within the United States” apply?
¶11
Due to the lack of discernable legislative intent, the statute’s plain language gives
rise to three equally plausible interpretations. The broadest of the readings would find
infringement liability if a party makes an offer within the United States to sell the
product, regardless of the location of intended sale.24 Alternatively, under a slightly
stricter reading, an infringement will be found if a party, located anywhere in the world,
offers to sell a patented invention within the United States.25 Lastly, under the strictest
statutory interpretation, offer to sell infringement would require that both the offer and
the sale occur within the United States. Congress has not yet addressed which of the
above interpretations is most consistent with the policy behind the addition of offer to sell
infringement to § 271. Shaping of the new offer to sell prong of § 271(a) has largely
depended on the few encounters that the Federal Circuit has had with the provision over
the past decade.
¶10

III. FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S INTERPRETATION OF OFFER TO SELL INFRINGEMENT
PRIOR TO TRANSOCEAN
¶12

Since offer to sell infringement is a recent addition to U.S. patent law, federal case
law interpreting the provision has just begun to evolve. Prior to Transocean, the Federal
Circuit addressed offer to sell infringement in only two cases: 3D Systems, Inc. v.
Aarotech Laboratories, Inc.26 and Rotec.27 Because 3D Systems only addressed the reach
of offer to sell claims in the context of personal jurisdiction, most of the literature refers
to Rotec as the leading authority on the actual merits of offer to sell infringement.28

22

35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
Id.
24
See David Sulkis, Note, Patent Infringement by Offer to Sell: Rotec Industries, Inc. v. Mitsubishi
Corporation, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1099, 1103, 1124–28 (2001) (arguing that an offer to sell made within the
United States “is an infringement of the patentee’s exclusionary right, regardless of whether or where the
product is ultimately sold, or whether or where it is delivered”); accord Wesley Jessen Corp. v. Bausch &
Lomb, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 2d 228, 234 (D. Del. 2003) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that “an ‘offer to
sell’ [infringement] can only take place if there is also an unlawful sale within the United States” and
holding that to require so would “make[] the ‘offer to sell’ language in § 271(a) superfluous”).
25
See Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1258–60 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Newman, J.,
concurring) (arguing that an offer can be infringing only if the contemplated sale would infringe the patent,
and therefore, the sale must be contemplated to occur within the United States).
26
160 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
27
215 F.3d 1246.
28
See Timothy R. Holbrook, Territoriality Waning? Patent Infringement for Offering in the United
States to Sell an Invention Abroad, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 701, 724 (2004) (recognizing Rotec as the first
case to address the merits of offer to sell infringement).
23
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The Rotec court approached the offer to sell infringement issue by first examining
whether an offer was made within the United States.29 After finding no evidence of such
an offer, the court stopped its analysis and refused to extend any offer to sell liability to
the seller.30 The Federal Circuit followed the same methodology in a subsequent case,
MEMC Electronic Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp.,31 which dealt
with a situation similar to Rotec. The court in MEMC also started its analysis with an
inquiry of domestic offer activity and found no offer to sell infringement after finding no
domestic offers.32 Many lower courts have interpreted these two cases, taken together, to
require an offer within the United States in cases of offer to sell infringement.33 To better
explain the status of offer to sell infringement, this Part provides a detailed account of the
milestone decisions leading up to Transocean.
A. 3D Systems: The Federal Circuit’s First Encounter with Offer to Sell Infringement

¶14

3D Systems was the first offer to sell infringement case that came before the
Federal Circuit.34 However, unlike Rotec, this case focused on whether state or federal
law should apply when defining what constituted an offer under § 271(a).35 The plaintiff
sued Aarotech for soliciting business in California using certain kinds of promotional
materials. Aarotech (a West Virginia company) argued that the district court in
California lacked personal jurisdiction over it because, under California state law, the
quotation letters did not constitute offers to sell. The Federal Circuit rejected this
argument. Recognizing that this was a case of first impression, the court held that
Aarotech’s activities in the forum state were sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction
for the purpose of offer to sell infringement under § 271(a). The court further concluded
that Aarotech’s price quotation letters constituted offers to sell within the meaning of
§ 271(a) even though the letters purported to not be offers.36 In reaching this conclusion,
the court noted, “[o]ne of the purposes of adding ‘offer[] to sell’ to § 271(a) was to
prevent exactly the type of activity [Aarotech] has engaged in, i.e., generating interest in
a potential[ly] infringing product to the commercial detriment of the rightful patentee.”37
B. Rotec: The Leading Interpretation

¶15

Rotec was the first Federal Circuit case that addressed whether offer to sell
infringement should be construed to require an offer be made within the United States. In
1995, the government of the People’s Republic of China solicited bid proposals for
concrete delivery systems for the Three Gorges Dam project on the Yangtze River.38
Defendant Mitsubishi, a Japanese company, entered into a joint venture with a French
29

Rotec, 215 F.3d at 1256.
Id. at 1257.
31
420 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
32
Id. at 1375.
33
See discussion infra Part IV.
34
3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
35
Id. at 1378.
36
Id. at 1379 (stating that the price quotation letters “state[d] on their face that they [we]re purportedly
not offers, but to treat them as anything other than offers to sell would be to exalt form over substance”).
37
Id. (second alteration in original).
38
Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
30

583

NOR THWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLEC TUAL PROPER TY

[2012

company and a U.S. company to prepare and submit a bid in response to the solicitation.
The plaintiff was a U.S. company and the owner of a patent covering the concrete
delivery systems that the defendant planned to deliver to the Chinese government. It was
undisputed that the contemplated sale was to take place in China and all manufacturing
and assembly of the component took place outside of the United States.39
¶16
Rotec sued Mitsubishi and its partners for, inter alia, direct infringement of its
patent by offering to sell a patented product within the United States.40 Rotec procured
several pieces of evidence to support its proposition that an offer to sell had been made
within the United States, including: (1) a meeting between Mitsubishi and its partners in
the United States; (2) visits by the Chinese representative to the U.S. company’s
headquarters in Illinois; (3) the U.S. company’s involvement in preparing and submitting
the bid—particularly its involvement in pricing, product design, and some financial
aspects of the bid, which were carried out in the U.S. company’s Illinois headquarters;
and (4) the offer stipulated that non-staple components of the systems were to be made
within the Unites States by a domestic supplier.41
¶17
Mitsubishi countered by offering evidence that “the bid proposal for the systems
was finalized at a meeting in Hong Kong, that the bid proposal was presented in China,
that all negotiations with the Chinese government prior to signing the contract occurred
in China, and that the contract was signed in China.”42
1. The Majority’s Opinion
¶18

Confronted for the first time with deciding the merits of an offer to sell
infringement claim, the Federal Circuit’s analysis in Rotec provided significant guidance
on both the definition and application of the offer to sell provision under § 271(a). The
court began its analysis by pointing out the strong territorial nature of U.S. patent law:
“[T]he right conferred by a patent under [U.S. patent] law is confined to the United States
and its territories, and infringement of this right cannot be predicated of acts wholly done
in a foreign country.”43 However, the majority did not use this territorial principle to
decide whether a domestic offer to sell products to a foreign country fell within the
purview of § 271(a). Instead, the court applied this principle to confine the range of
activities that would be considered for the meaning of “offer” and held that only activities
within the United States could be considered in determining whether an infringing offer
for sale was made.44
¶19
The majority then proceeded to reaffirm the purpose of offer to sell infringement
articulated by the court in 3D Systems.45 The court stated that by amending § 271(a) to
include the offer to sell prong, “Congress sought to strengthen the protections afforded”

39

Id. at 1249–50.
Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 810, 812 (C.D. Ill. 1998).
41
Rotec, 215 F.3d at 1249.
42
Rotec, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 817.
43
Rotec, 215 F.3d at 1251 (quoting Dowagiag Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 650
(1915)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
44
Id. (“[W]e must establish whether Defendants’ activities in the United States . . . are sufficient to
establish an ‘offer for sale.’”).
45
Id. at 1255.
40
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to patent owners.46 It pointed out, however, that “[t]he question remains . . . as to how
much strength Congress wished to add to the parameters of a patent grant.”47
¶20
In defining what activities would constitute an offer, the court rejected the broad
definition used by 3D Systems and embraced the narrower “norms of traditional contract
law,” requiring a formal “commercial offer for sale.”48 Applying this standard, the court
found that the activities alleged by Rotec did not show that Mitsubishi “communicated a
‘manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person
in understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude it.’” 49 As a
result, there was insufficient evidence that Mitsubishi “generat[ed] interest in a
potential[ly] infringing product to the commercial detriment of the rightful patentee.”50
Finding that there was no evidence that an offer to sell happened within the United States,
the majority ended its analysis, concluding that there was no other genuine dispute
regarding the material facts and entering judgment as a matter of law for the defendant.
¶21
The majority’s analysis stopped short once it found no evidence of a domestic
offer—it did not address the question of whether a domestic offer contemplating a
foreign sale would constitute direct infringement under § 271(a). This holding left open
the question of how to interpret offer to sell infringement in the context of cross-border
transactions. However, many perceived this opinion to imply that had the court found
evidence of an offer being made within the United States, it would have found direct
infringement even though the manufacturing and delivery all took place outside the
United States.51
2. Judge Newman’s Concurring Opinion
¶22

Judge Newman, concurring only in the judgment, noted the underlying problem in
the majority’s holding: “[T]he majority opinion necessarily accepts the critical premise
that an ‘offer to sell’ made in the United States can constitute patent infringement even
when the contemplated sale could not infringe the patent. I do not believe that 35 U.S.C.
§ 271 is correctly so interpreted.”52 In her view, the court should not have found that
Mitsubishi infringed, not because there was no evidence that Mitsubishi made an offer
within the United States, but because the contemplated sale would occur outside of the
United States. Judge Newman reasoned that “[t]he purpose of § 271(a) was to permit a
patentee to act against threatened infringing sale by establishing a cause of action before
actual sale occurred.”53 Therefore, “an offer to sell a device or system whose actual sale
can not infringe a United States patent is not an infringing act under § 271.”54
¶23
While Rotec’s majority and concurrence seemingly disagreed on whether a
domestic offer contemplating a foreign sale constitute direct infringement under § 271(a),
46

Id. at 1252.
Id.
48
Id. at 1254 (citing Pfaff v. Wells Elecs. Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67 (1998)).
49
Id. at 1257 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (1979)).
50
Id. at 1255 (first alteration in original) (quoting 3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373,
1379 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
51
See Sulkis, supra note 24, at 1101.
52
Rotec, 215 F.3d at 1258 (Newman, J., concurring).
53
Id. at 1259.
54
Id.
47
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this dispute might reflect a more fundamental disagreement. What exactly was the
purpose of adding offer to sell infringement? Was it to grant patentees a cause of action
at an earlier stage of infringement, or was it to create a new and independent cause of
action with the same force as the infringement of making, using, and selling? As shown
by the following discussion, a subsequent Federal Circuit opinion interpreting Rotec
seemingly followed the latter line of reasoning while several district court cases insisted
on applying the former policy, creating the current split among district courts over the
issue of cross-border deal-making.55
C. MEMC: Subsequent Federal Circuit Guidance
¶24

The implied emphasis on a domestic offer by the Rotec majority was further
affirmed by MEMC, which involved a similar transaction.56 The plaintiff in MEMC
claimed a Japanese manufacturer directly infringed by offering to sell patented silicon
wafers to a U.S. subsidiary of a Japanese buyer.57 The court noted in its analysis that “the
defendant must communicate[] a manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so
made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent to that bargain is
invited and will conclude it.”58 Applying the Rotec test, the court concluded that e-mails
exchanged between the Japanese manufacturer and the U.S. subsidiary, containing no
detailed price terms, could not be construed as a commercial offer for sale that would
bind the transaction once accepted.59
¶25
The MEMC court analyzed whether a domestic offer to sell was made despite the
fact that it found no sale had occurred or was contemplated to occur within the United
States.60 As noted by Judge Newman’s concurrence in Rotec, such an approach
necessarily accepts the premise that an offer to sell made within the United States
contemplating a sale outside the United States could still constitute direct infringement
under § 271(a).61 Curiously, Judge Newman was also on the MEMC panel and joined the
opinion in full, leading courts and one commentator to speculate that the Federal Circuit
would adopt Rotec’s approach in analyzing offer to sell infringement.62
IV. CONFUSION IN THE DISTRICT COURTS AFTER ROTEC
¶26

The Federal Circuit’s guidance on offer to sell infringement in Rotec and MEMC,
or the lack thereof, has led to conflicting decisions at the district court level. Many courts
interpret Rotec and MEMC together as indicating that offer to sell infringement requires
55
See MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir.
2005); c.f. Cybiotronics, Ltd. v. Golden Source Elecs., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1152 (C.D. Cal. 2001); Wing Shing
Prods. v. Simatelex Manufactory Co., 479 F. Supp. 2d 388 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). For detailed discussion, see
infra Part IV.
56
420 F.3d 1369.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 1376 (quoting Rotec, 215 F.3d at 1255) (internal quotation omitted).
59
Id. at 1377.
60
Id.
61
Rotec, 215 F.3d at 1258.
62
See Rex W. Miller, II, Construing “Offers to Sell” Patent Infringement: Why Economic Interests
Rather than Territoriality Should Guide the Construction, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 403, 417 n.101 (2009). For
examples of courts following the Rotec majority, see discussion infra Part IV-A.
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that an offer be made within the United States.63 Other courts have sided with Judge
Newman’s concurrence in reaching the opposite conclusion—that an offer made in the
United States that contemplates a foreign sale cannot constitute patent infringement under
§ 271(a).64
¶27
An empirical analysis of nine district court opinions that adjudicated offer to sell
infringement claims under § 271(a) after Rotec reveals that although courts generally
agree on infringement liabilities of domestic transactions, there is a sharp division in
courts over transactions involving domestic offers contemplating foreign sales.65
A. Opinions that Followed the ROTEC Majority
FIGURE 1. FINDINGS FROM DISTRICT COURT CASES ON OFFER TO SELL INFRINGEMENT
CLAIMS INVOLVING CROSS-BORDER TRANSACTIONS
8

No infringement

Number of Cases

7

3

6

Infringement

5
4
4
3
2
1
1

1*

0

Both

Offer only

Sale only

* No liability found due to lack of personal jurisdiction in forum state

¶28

The cases following Rotec (included in Figure 1) interpreted MEMC to propose that
the focus of an offer to sell analysis is whether there was a domestic offer, regardless of
where the sale was contemplated. These district courts adopted this approach and
reasoned that the adoption of § 271(a) offer to sell infringement was to provide U.S.
patentees a separate cause of action against domestic offering activities.

63

See discussion infra Part IV-A.
See discussion infra Part IV-B; Cybiotronics, Ltd. v. Golden Source Elecs., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1152
(C.D. Cal. 2001); Semiconductor Energy Lab. v. Chi Mei Optoelectronics Corp., 531 F. Supp. 2d 1084
(N.D. Cal. 2007).
65
See infra Figure 1. The cases included in this study are: Trueposition Inc. v. Andrew Corp., 568 F.
Supp. 2d 500 (D. Del 2008); Fellowes, Inc. v. Michilin Prosperity Co., 491 F. Supp. 2d 571 (E.D. Va.
2007); Semiconductor, 531 F. Supp. 2d 1084; Wing Shing Prods. v. Simatelex Manufactory Co., 479 F.
Supp. 2d 388 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Med. Solutions, Inc. v. C Change Surgical LLC, 468 F. Supp. 2d 130
(D.D.C. 2006); Majestec 125, LLC v. Sealift, Inc., No. 1:06-CV-104, 2006 WL 2039984 (W.D. Mich. July
19, 2006); SEB, S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 412 F. Supp. 2d 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Wesley Jessen
Corp. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 2d 228 (D. Del 2003); Cybiotronics, 130 F. Supp. 2d 1152.
64
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¶29

The first district court decision adopting the position that offers made within the
United States to sell a patented invention outside of the United States may constitute
direct infringement under § 271(a) was Halmar Robicon Group v. Toshiba International
Corp.66 In Halmar Robicon, the court dealt with an offer made in Houston to sell a
patented invention in Canada. After finding that an offer was made within the United
States, the court denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment, suggesting that the
court must have considered a domestic offer for foreign sale as a possible infringement.67
¶30
The U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware has also expressly found
infringement for a domestic offer contemplating a sale outside of the United States. In
Wesley Jessen Corp. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., the defendant was accused of infringement
for making an offer within the United States to sell patented contact lenses outside the
country.68 The court noted that the precedents in Federal Circuit case law with regard to
offer to sell infringement supported a separate cause of action for patent infringement
based solely on the domestic offer.69 The court explicitly rejected the notion that offer to
sell infringement must involve a contemplated sale within the United States and stated
that “[t]he geographic location and physical destination of the subject matter of the
‘offer’ appear to be immaterial to the analysis, so long as the ‘offer’ was made in the
United States.”70
¶31
A more recent case in New York also adopted the same position as Rotec and
Wesley Jessen.71 The facts in SEB, S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co. are similar to those
in Wesley Jessen, in that the defendant was accused of infringement for making an offer
to sell within the United States (in this case, deep fryers). The court largely employed the
same analysis from Wesley Jessen and concluded that the plaintiff had presented
sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that the defendant made an
offer to sell within the United States. The court emphasized that a patentee may suffer
economic harm even if the offer contemplates foreign sale, and allowed the plaintiff’s
case to survive summary judgment.72
B. Opinions that Followed Newman’s Concurrence
¶32

Another line of district court cases reached the opposite conclusion and followed
the reasoning of Judge Newman’s concurrence. Shortly after the Rotec opinion was
issued, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California tackled a similar
scenario where a Hong Kong telephone manufacturer was sued for infringement by
allegedly making offers in the United States to sell the infringing product overseas.73 The
court in Cybiotronics noted that the Rotec opinion did not decide the question of liability
66

See Halmar Robicon Grp. v. Toshiba Int’l Corp., No. 98-501, 1999 WL 1427830 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 17,
1999).
67
Id.
68
256 F. Supp. 2d 228.
69
Id. at 232.
70
Id. at 233–34.
71
See SEB, S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 412 F. Supp. 2d 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d on other
grounds, 594 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (avoiding the offers to sell issue but finding infringement based on
the conclusion that the sale actually occurred within the United States).
72
Id. at 341 n.6 (“Any offers that Defendants made in the United States would work to the commercial
detriment to SEB, regardless of whether the resulting sales took place in the United States or China.”).
73
Cybiotronics, Ltd. v. Golden Source Elecs., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1152 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
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on an offer to sell goods outside of the United States.74 Instead, the court found the
opinion from the Southern District of Texas in Quality Tubing, Inc. v. Precision Tube
Holdings Corp.,75 although issued prior to Rotec, to be “highly persuasive.”76 The court
noted Quality Tubing’s reasoning that the addition of offer to sell infringement to
§ 271(a) “was not intended to add a whole new substantive basis for liability . . . , but
was merely intended to incorporate . . . activities that might pre-date the actual
consummation of an [infringing] sale within the United States.”77 As a result, the court
dismissed the plaintiff’s direct infringement claim, reasoning that even if the plaintiff
could present sufficient evidence to show that an offer was made within the United
States, there could be no offer to sell infringement if the parties contemplated that the sale
would be consummated outside the American market.78
¶33
A second case along this line is Wing Shing Products v. Simatelex Manufactory
Co., in which a U.S. patent holder sued a Hong Kong-based manufacturer for offering
infringing coffeemakers in the United States that were delivered in Hong Kong.79 The
court recognized the conflicting opinions within the Federal Circuit and among district
courts.80 Furthermore, it drew support for limiting liability under offer to sell
infringement to offers contemplating domestic sales only from the language of § 271(a)
and (f), rejecting the SEB court’s reasoning that reading § 271(a) to require a
contemplated sale within the United States would render the offer to sell language
superfluous.81 Interestingly, both SEB and Wing Shing came out of the Southern District
of New York, representing a split within the same district.
¶34
Shortly after Wing Shing, a Northern District of California case, Semiconductor
Energy Laboratory v. Chi Mei Optoelectronics Corp., embraced Judge Newman’s
position and that of the courts in Cybiotronics, Wing Shing, and Quality Tubing.82
Finding a lack of controlling authority from the Federal Circuit and a division among the
district courts on this issue, the court in Semiconductor turned to United States Supreme
Court precedent for guidance.83 In Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., the Supreme Court
emphasized the presumption of United States patent law against extraterritorial
application.84 Drawing from this presumption, the Semiconductor court chose to side
with the proposition that offer to sell infringement only stands if the contemplated sale is
within the United States.85
74

Id. at 1170.
75 F. Supp. 2d 613 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
76
Cybiotronics, 130 F. Supp. 2d at 1171.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 1170.
79
479 F. Supp. 2d 388 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
80
Id. at 406–07.
81
See id. at 407; contra SEB, S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 412 F. Supp. 2d 336, 342 n.6 (S.D.N.Y.
2006), aff’d on other grounds, 594 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
82
Semiconductor Energy Lab. v. Chi Mei Optoelectronics Corp., 531 F. Supp. 2d 1084 (N.D. Cal.
2007).
83
Id. at 1111 (citing Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007)). Semiconductor was the
first court to address the scope of offer to sell infringement after the Supreme Court’s decision in Microsoft.
84
550 U.S. at 439.
85
Semiconductor, 531 F. Supp. 2d at 1111 (“In light of the strong presumption against extraterritorial
application, the court holds that ‘the “offer to sell” language was not intended to (and could not) extend the
protection of a U.S. patent to allow the patentee to . . . prevent sales taking place in other countries.’”)
(alteration in original) (quoting Cybiotronics, Ltd. v. Golden Source Elecs., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1171
75
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The above review of district court opinions highlights the lingering divide among
courts over the scope of offer to sell infringement in the context of domestic offers
contemplating foreign sales. Nine years after the Rotec opinion, there is hope that the
debate will finally be resolved by the recent Federal Circuit opinion in Transocean.86
The court in Transocean made clear that Rotec and MEMC never suggested that an offer
to sell analysis should be centered on the location of the offer.87 Rather, “the location of
the contemplated sale controls.”88 As shown by the subsequent district court opinion
applying § 271(a) to a cross-border transaction, it seems that Transocean has come into
effect in directing courts to apply the sale-centered analysis.89
V. TRANSOCEAN AND ITS IMPLICATIONS IN CROSS-BORDER TRANSACTIONS
A. Summary of the Facts

¶36

The plaintiff, Transocean Deepwater Offshore Drilling (Transocean), appealed the
district court’s summary judgment decision to the Federal Circuit, inter alia, dismissing
Transocean’s claim of offer to sell infringement.90 The Federal Circuit reversed the
lower court’s decision and held that an offer made in Norway for the sale and use of a
potentially infringing product within the United States could constitute offer to sell
infringement under § 271(a). The court used case law and legislative history for its
rationale.91
¶37
Transocean accused Maersk USA of infringing its patents on offshore drilling
92
rigs. In 2005, Maersk USA’s parent company, Maersk A/S (a Danish company), and
Statoil ASA (a Norwegian company) negotiated a contract to build a rig in Singapore that
would allegedly infringe upon Transocean’s patented rig parts.93 The defendant, Maersk
Contractors USA, Inc. (Maersk), a U.S. affiliate of Maersk A/S, executed the contract
with Statoil Gulf of Mexico LLC (Statoil) (a U.S. affiliate of Statoil ASA) in Norway. 94
The contract specified the “Operating Area” for the rig to include the U.S. Gulf of
Mexico, which was deemed evidence that the contemplated sale would occur within the
United States.95
¶38
The district court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment of
noninfringement, holding that no sale or offer to sell had occurred that would invoke
liability under § 271(a).96 The district court’s decision relied on the facts that the
negotiation and execution of the contract both took place in Norway and that the contract
(C.D. Cal. 2001)).
86
617 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see also discussion infra Part V.
87
617 F.3d at 1309.
88
Id.
89
ION, Inc. v. Sercel, Inc., No. 5:06-CV-236-DF, 2010 WL 3768110, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 16, 2010)
(citing Transocean, 617 F.3d 1296).
90
Transocean, 617 F.3d at 1301.
91
Id. at 1309.
92
Id. at 1307.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 1308.
95
Id. at 1307.
96
Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA Inc., No. H-07-2392, 2008
WL 6071708, at *8–9 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 22, 2008).
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allowed Maersk to have the option to make alterations to the rig to avoid infringement. 97
There was no dispute that the contract executed by the defendant constituted an offer to
sell the infringing products.98 The issue in dispute was whether infringement liability
should arise from this offer. Citing the Rotec majority and MEMC, the defendant argued
that since no offer was made within the United States, there should be no offer to sell
infringement under § 271(a).99 The plaintiff, on the other hand, “argue[d] that a contract
between two U.S. companies for delivery or performance in the U.S. must be an offer to
sell within the United States under § 271(a).”100
B. Holdings of Transocean
¶39

The Federal Circuit began by noting that the analysis of offer to sell infringement
under § 271(a) would follow Rotec and use traditional contract principles. The court then
framed the issue presented as “whether an offer which is made in Norway by a U.S.
company to a U.S. company to sell a product within the U.S., for delivery and use within
the U.S. constitutes an offer to sell within the U.S. under § 271(a).”101 This is exactly the
kind of question that was left open by Rotec and MEMC and had caused a strong divide
among district courts. The conclusion given by the Federal Circuit in this case is short
and clear: it does.102
¶40
The court first confirmed the underlying purpose of offer to sell infringement under
§ 271(a) as explained by 3D Systems—to prevent “generating interest in a potential
infringing product to the commercial detriment of the rightful patentee.”103 The court
then pointed to the Supreme Court’s decision in Microsoft and noted the presumption
against extraterritoriality in that decision.104 In particular, the court quoted from
Microsoft that “[i]t is the general rule under United States patent law that no infringement
occurs when a patented product is made and sold in another country.”105 Agreeing with
the courts that followed this presumption to find that offer to sell infringement must
involve a domestic sale, the Federal Circuit held that when it comes to offer to sell
infringement, “the location of the contemplated sale controls.”106
¶41
The defendant argued that the decisions in Rotec and MEMC stand for the
requirement that, for there to be an offer to sell within the United States, the offering
activities must occur within the United States.107 Since both the negotiation and
execution of the contract took place in Norway, the defendant argued that it had not
infringed the plaintiff’s patents within the scope of offer to sell infringement under
§ 271(a).

97

Id.
Transocean, 617 F.3d at 1308.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 1309.
102
Id.
103
3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
104
Transocean, 617 F.3d at 1309 (citing Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 441 (2007)).
105
Microsoft, 550 U.S. at 441.
106
Transocean, 617 F.3d at 1309.
107
Id. at 1308.
98
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¶42

The Federal Circuit disagreed. It held that neither Rotec nor MEMC controlled this
issue because neither had decided the territorial reach of offer to sell infringement.108
Both cases, the court found, had only considered whether there was enough evidence that
an offer had been made within the United States. As a result, the court had essentially
overruled the interpretation of Rotec by the courts in Wesley Jessen and SEB.
¶43
After its discussion, the court held that a contract between two U.S. companies for
performance in the United States may constitute offer to sell infringement and the district
court’s grant of summary judgment of noninfringement should be vacated.109 The court
further noted that, to determine whether a company was contemplating an infringing sale
within the United States, the district court must consider what was originally offered, but
not what was ultimately delivered.110 This instruction essentially excluded the
defendant’s argument that there was no infringing sale being contemplated within the
United States because the rig that was eventually delivered to U.S. waters had been
altered to avoid infringement.
VI. WHERE DO THINGS STAND AFTER TRANSOCEAN?
A. Reconciling Transocean, Rotec, and MEMC
¶44

Transocean is the first case in which the Federal Circuit has directly taken on the
issue of whether infringement should be found in cross-border transactions that involved
both domestic and foreign activities. The holding that the location of the contemplated
sale should control whether infringement liability arises will likely close the longstanding debate among district courts on this very issue.
¶45
However, the holding of Transocean carefully avoided overruling Rotec and
MEMC by limiting the authority of these cases to the query of whether an offer has been
made within the United States. The holdings in these cases—that whether an offer was
made should be decided according to the traditional norms of contract laws—are still
controlling authority.111 It seemed that the Federal Circuit had never meant to interpret
§ 271(a) as requiring, and only requiring, a domestic offer to establish offer to sell
infringement. The Rotec and MEMC decisions simply reflect the courts’ unwillingness to
adjudicate issues that were not necessary for reaching the correct conclusion. The sharp
divide among district courts was merely the result of some courts’ misunderstanding of
Rotec. Or is that really the case? Apparently, Judge Newman also read the Rotec
majority’s approach to emphasize the location of the offer regardless of where the
contemplated sale is to take place.112 Nonetheless, the Transocean decision has set the
record straight and should eliminate any lower court’s confusion regarding this particular
issue.
¶46
Moreover, there seems to be little left of the Rotec and MEMC decisions after
Transocean. As Transocean no longer requires an offer to be made within the United
States, the only guidance courts now have from Rotec is how to define an offer under

108

Id. at 1309–10.
Id. at 1313.
110
Id. at 1310.
111
Id. at 1308.
112
Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
109

592

Vol. 10:7]

Yan Wang

§ 271(a)—i.e., to use “norms of traditional contract analysis.”113 Once an offer is found
to have been made, the analysis moves on to determine the location of the contemplated
sale.
B. Was Transocean Correctly Decided?
¶47

Transocean is a milestone case in that the Federal Circuit took a major step forward
in interpretation of offer to sell infringement, which will hopefully end the nine-year
quarrel among courts caused by the lack of congressional explanation of the 1994
amendment of § 271(a) and Rotec. As a matter of fact, the most recent federal court
decision dealing with cross-border transactions has expressly followed the Transocean
reasoning,114 indicating that the decade-long court split may finally be coming to an end.
¶48
Transocean’s sale-centered approach provides courts with greater certainty. It is
easier to define the location of a sale than that of an offer. In today’s global economy and
Internet culture, business is conducted over e-mail, international telephone calls, or even
text messages—technologies that diminish territorial barriers between nations.
Establishing a national boundary around these cross-border activities would be practically
impossible in some cases.
¶49
In contrast, the location of a contemplated sale is easier to identify by the
destination of delivery, a standard currently employed by the courts for the purpose of
defining a sale infringement under § 271(a).115 It is worth noting that the method to
decide the location of a sale based on delivery destination suffers from its own flaws. In
scenarios where the sale was for a patented process or business method, the location of
the sale would be hard to ascertain, given that the transaction does not involve physical
delivery. This dilemma, however, may be resolved by excluding method and process
patents from the protection of the offer to sell language under § 271(a).116
¶50
In addition, Transocean is consistent with the proposition that offer to sell
infringement was added to § 271(a) to provide patentees with a cause of action to stop
potentially infringing activities at an earlier stage, without having to wait until after the
actual harm has occurred. Some argue that by allowing people to make offers within the
United States for sales that occur outside of the country, domestic patentees would
nevertheless suffer economic harm due to price erosion caused by the competing offer. 117
However, in today’s global economy, sales are negotiated and executed across the world.
The location of a competing offer would be unlikely to have a significant effect on the
price erosion a patentee suffers from sales occurring outside of the United States.
Expanding the reach of U.S. patent laws in this case would not help improve the financial
113

Id. at 1255.
ION, Inc. v. Sercel, No. 5:06-CV-236-DF, 2010 WL 3768110, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 16, 2010)
(following Transocean and denying the infringement claim against offers made within the United States for
foreign sales).
115
See Transocean, 617 F.3d at 1310 (finding that the infringing sale occurred within the United States
based upon the “Operating Area” provision in the contract); SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594
F.3d 1360, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (finding infringing sale within the United States even though the deep
fryers were shipped to the United States f.o.b. (free on board) in China).
116
See NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Congress has
consistently expressed the view that it understands infringement of method claims under section 271(a) to
be limited to use.”).
117
See Holbrook, supra note 4.
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interests of U.S. patentees, but, at the same time, it would likely upset the presumption
against extraterritorial reach of U.S. patent laws.
¶51
On the other hand, the strategy proposed by Transocean is consistent with the
presumption expressed by the Supreme Court against expanding the territorial reach of
U.S. patent law. The Supreme Court has noted that “[i]t is a longstanding principle of
American law ‘that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to
apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.’”118 The basis for such
a presumption is to avoid potential conflict with another nation’s laws.
VII.
¶52

CONCLUSION

Transocean represents the Federal Circuit’s first substantial guidance on the issue
of cross-border offer to sell infringement. After almost a decade of struggling and
learning, the court has now decided that the offer to sell language in § 271(a) should be
read as requiring an offer, made anywhere in the world, for a sale to be consummated
within the United States. Such a construction is consistent with the congressional intent
to create an early action point for patentees to stop potential infringement activities as
well as the Supreme Court’s presumption against expanding the territorial reach of U.S.
patent law.
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Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (quoting Foley
Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
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